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Reading a scholar’s writing is at any rate a treat; the benefit of studying it always 
seems to exceed the cost of possibly confronting doubtful premises or linear 
thinking. Venkatasubramanian’s quest for fair inequality fits that scenario. A 
professor of chemical engineering with Columbia University, he confidently threads 
interdisciplinary domains in the attempt to prove (formally) that capitalism may 
accommodate fairness and prosperity in the long term. The book content fulfils the 
promise of erudition of this ambitious project. The reader enjoys clear, at times 
witty, cogent prose within a wide range of scholarship, including moral philosophy, 
statistical mechanics, information theory, thermodynamics, game theory, systems 
engineering, and free-market economics. These incursions are meant to feed on each 
other to substantiate the book’s ‘mathematical theory’ of ‘the fairest inequality of 
income’ in a capitalist society.  
The organizing themes evolve around four ‘foundational questions’ (17-20; see Table 
1 below), which in fact divide the book in three parts: before and after chapter 5, 
and chapter 5 itself. 
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Table 1 The conceptual framework of ‘fair inequality’
The socio-economic context: A free-market environment comprising utility-maximizing 
employees and profit-maximizing companies…’transaction costs are negligible, and no 
externalities are present.’ (p. 44) 
‘Foundational’ themes Assessment criteria
Ideal income distribution ‘The notion of fairness plays a central role in driving the 
emergence and spread of the salary (in general, utility) 
distribution through the free-market mechanism...The 
collective actions of all the employees, combined with the 
profit-maximizing survival actions of all the companies…lead 
toward a more fair allocation of pay.’ (p. 48)
Fairness ‘One must not treat two equal entities unequally.’ (The 
equality principle)
‘You get more for doing more, and you get less for doing less.’ 
(The proportionality principle)
‘Decisions are not made arbitrarily, but are based on facts in 
evidence.’ (The arbitrariness avoidance principle) (pp. 87-8) 
Morality ‘Morality is about whether the free-market system is 
benefiting a majority of the people or only a small minority.’ 
(p. 115)
Fairness is a critical 
property for the stability 
of a free market
Maximizing fairness ‘is indeed maximizing the total utility 
of the entire population…The free market makes sense, 
under ideal conditions, not only from the perspective of 
economic efficiency but also morally. The ideal free market 
is intrinsically moral, as far as distributive justice is 
concerned.’ (p. 119)
Chapter Five is central to the book’s argument for two reasons. For one thing, it 
is the lengthiest among the eight chapters, covering a third of the text body, and 
the place where the author advances most emphatically and explicitly his theory’s 
‘mathematical principles’. For another, this is also the place where the author’s 
research results of thirty-two years (1983-2015) are collected and introduced in 
connection with the ‘philosophical theories of human societies’ (xvii) to form a 
‘unified framework’ – the ‘statistical teleodynamics perspective’. The endeavour 
eventuates in developing a ‘formal quantitative theory to show when inequality 
is fair’ (17) and fairness (in income distribution) is maximized (23). ‘Fairness…
is after all, at the very core of a capitalist democracy’ (16) the author assumes, 
which, even if most of us took it for granted, does not make the reciprocal hold 
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true as well: capitalism, or any historical system for that matter, is not reasonably 
thought to lie at the core of the concept of fairness. It results, then, that in the 
author’s view the way we interpret ‘fairness’ is necessarily inferred from the way we 
interpret capitalism in the first place. On these premises, the theoretical background 
straightjackets the author’s alleged conceptual openness – an ‘engineer’s approach…
without worrying too much about philosophical niceties and economic orthodoxy’ 
(193) – into gradual dissolution from a comprehensive to a narrow view of social 
progress, from criticism of mainstream to reshaping it, and from the challenge of a 
new (multidisciplinary) paradigm to a (new) encroachment of economic (and social) 
thought by mathematical foundations. 
Like any other attempt to see human society through the lens of an ‘engineering 
problem’, ‘not restricted by society-specific details and nuances’ (33), an ideal 
economic world can be imagined with a view, commendable though it may be, to 
setting yardsticks in the realm of policy-making. The author may assert confidently 
that, say, ‘in the United States, the ideal income-share of the top 1% is 5.8%’ (161) as 
the mathematical approach underlying the imagined analogies is inevitably self-
consistent. The topic has become the staple of criticism in the heterodox economics 
tradition and it would be redundant to attempt here to double the arguments. What 
remains, though highly instructive, is to dissect once more the way philosophy, of 
a moral and political kind in our case, is bereft of power to inspire disciplinary 
breakthroughs to be turned instead into an object of mathematization – a 
disciplinary challenge of its own.
The conceptual framework, as summarized in Table 1, shapes the analogy between 
‘systems of inanimate entities, such molecules’, whose theories were being developed 
‘about 150 years ago’ (31), and the dynamic system of a free-market economy 
‘with millions of interacting agents exhibiting statistical behaviour’ (xviii). 
The ‘equilibrium income distribution’ is a problem, which can be modelled as ‘a 
population game with features of a congestion game’ along with ‘a unique Nash 
equilibrium’ (61-2), which, as it happens, demonstrates the same phenomenon as 
in ‘the statistical thermodynamic equilibrium reached by colliding gas molecules’ 
(84). The analogy breaks with the admission that people, or a ‘large collection of 
intelligent agents’ (xvi), are driven by a ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’ – they exhibit teleological 
behaviour. Whereas organic life follows ‘the design of the universe’, it is the free-
market, society’s universe by virtue of analogy, which lays down its own, purpose-
driven rules. Happiness derives from work ‘in the form of economic rewards’ (41), 
an apparently instantaneous computation in an apparently frictionless ‘dynamics of 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics XII: 2 (2019) 135
Cojanu, Valentin (2019), ‘Review of Venkat Venkatasubramanian, How Much 
Inequality is Fair? Mathematical Principles of a Moral, Optimal, and Stable 
Capitalist Society’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on 
Economic and Social Issues, XII: 2, 132-136
switching jobs or employees’ (31) as regards salary (‘a proxy for utility’ (48), but also 
the prospect of ‘recognition and career advancement’ from which a ‘disutility for 
effort’ is subtracted (50). 
The crux of the argument comes in two related features of the ‘teleodynamics’ 
logic: stability and robustness of the ‘equilibrium income distribution.’ Entropy 
(or ‘the game theoretic potential’ (108)), ‘an important property of distributions’, 
is a measure of fairness, not randomness: ‘maximizing entropy produces a self-
organized coherent categorization of employees (which results in lognormal 
income distribution). The ideal free market for labour promotes fairness as an 
emergent self-organized property.’ (106) The implication comes up in clear contours: 
impediments to free market functioning, hence to long-term resilience, such as rent-
seeking, market power, or the influence of the working class (120), undermine ‘the 
moral underpinning of the social contract.’ (120) 
Mathematical solutions are not the only instrument that lay the theoretical 
framework of teleodynamics at the foundation of social life’s most valuable goal – 
happiness. Discrete moments of philosophical reflection represented by a group of 
three – J. S. Mill, Rawls, and Nozick, to whom Adam Smith, Dworkin, Scanlon 
or Sen are occasionally adjoined, who do not answer the four questions (30), are 
equally needed to ground the book’s set of assumptions. How could it have been 
otherwise possible to defend the idea of a ‘moral’ capitalist society if not by recourse 
to 
l Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ to accept that ‘the government has defined the rules of 
the game in such a way that the resulting free market behaves ideally.’ (45)
l Nozick’s libertarianism stance to make palatable the allure of entropy as the 
appropriate measure of fairness because of its characteristic to be independent of 
‘the presence of market authority’ (107).
l Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ to sustain a utopic ‘level playing field’ (44-5) for all 
participants, a ‘reference state’ in which, for instance, all citizens ‘are physically 
and emotionally healthy’ and ‘different levels of incomes do not result in 
different levels of happiness’, or, equally relevant, ‘all other requirements of 
social justice have already been satisfied.’ (43-4)
With or without the ‘niceties’ of economics and philosophy, the author does not 
suspend critical examination of the overstated ambition of his intellectual project. 
One possible shortcoming may lie in the computational limits that preclude in-
depth social analysis. In a one-class system, people weigh ‘the utility from salary, 
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disutility from employment, and utility from future prospects to the same extent, 
as will do in a two-class society – encompassing, say, ‘an overwhelming majority of 
the population (say, 99%)…and a small minority (say 1%)…enjoying more happiness’ 
(213). Anything beyond a four-class society would not make ‘much sense’ because 
‘it will be difficult to verify the model’s predictions with empirical data.’ (213) But 
one-class systems are problematic too. For example, amidst a host of instructive 
data regarding the CEO pay ratio, the author’s answer to the question ‘How much of 
the company’s success is due to efforts of the CEO?’ comes in the form of a trivial if 
honest admission, ‘nobody really knows for certain.’ (175)
On the other hand, the author proves himself an astute observer of social life and its 
persistent dilemmas in relation to economic inequality. When perusing the future 
directions of research, we come across many social matters – such as bargaining 
power (say, of the working class), the impact of savings and unearned income such 
as dividends, demand for skills, the emergence of the gig economy (230-1) – that 
were simply assumed away to make room for neat formalism. Had all of them 
been duly considered in discussing the problematic issue of fairness, we would 
have agreed perhaps that finding ‘a pragmatic solution…to challenging trade-offs 
among liberty, fairness, and utility’ (193) may not be a goal in itself, let alone one 
worth pursuing. The book’s merit rests however elsewhere, namely on the persistent 
effort to instil modern philosophy in social analysis. It is not a singular effort – a 
thorough documentary research would surely have added a dozen kindred titles 
from recent literature – but one that stands out in originality, interdisciplinary 
focus, and crisp phrasing.    
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